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All’s Well That Ends Well
Dover, England 1599: The day is warm; the meadow is quiet. It is
also deserted, save for two people, a man and a woman. Intent on the
conquest of his love, and sure that there is only one way to achieve
victory, the man takes the woman by the hand. He looks her in the
eye, then says the same words that have sounded for ages before (and
would for ages yet) throughout marital celebrations in Western
Christendom: “I take thee as my wife.” The woman exchanges the
promise and succumbs. Seemingly, the world has not noticed a thing.
Except that it has. For different views on how marriage could be
performed in sixteenth-century Europe gave these words—a pre-
sent tense utterance of an intention to marry—markedly different
powers: If spoken by the man in Dover, the couple is married—with
or without a witness, consummated or not. However, if spoken by
his French cousin in Calais, at the exact same time, under an identi-
cal set of circumstances (right down to the field and the warm sum-
mer day), the couple is not married; the man is not a husband, the
woman, not a wife. Subsequent intercourse amounts to fornication,
with all its attendant consequences, but the status of the couple
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Shakespeare Reading. Oil painting by William Page, 1873–1874. Copyright Smithsonian
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vis-à-vis each other is unchanged. The couple in England, however,
has performed a “clandestine” or “handfast” marriage.1
The difference between the cases goes to the root of marriage as
understood in medieval and Renaissance times. The Church had
long conceived marriage as a sacrament that the two parties, husband
and wife, conferred upon themselves. Although strongly encour-
aged, Church witness was not central to the validity of the marriage
contract. For obvious reasons, the private marriage caused problems
for the Church, both before and after the Reformation. On ideo-
logical grounds, a private ceremony dispensed with holy witness to
the most life-affirming of institutions. On practical grounds, it was
nearly impossible to ensure that a marriage had actually taken place.
It is not surprising that countless men, having satisfied their lust, sub-
sequently denied their responsibility. In fact, records show that out
of seventeen such cases in the Bishop’s Court of Chester, ten involve
men trying to sneak out of their contracts after having taken their
pleasure.2 Children born of such frustrated unions were bastards;
they had no name and could not inherit.
On the Continent, the Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed
Churches recognized the problem of the private marriage and made
a public, Church-witnessed ceremony necessary to marital validi-
ty.3 As part of the Council of Trent, the Catholic Church even
passed a decree, known as Tametsi, to address the abuse.4 However,
Anglican England was under no obligation to these decrees, and the
Englishman, as opposed to his Continental counterpart, could
wreak all sorts of havoc with his secret promises, hand-clasping, and
ring-giving.
And therein lies the play, at least for William Shakespeare, who
penned some of his most philosophical—and to many critics, mad-
dening—set of comedies around the turn of the seventeenth centu-
ry: the so-called “problem plays.” The “problem” with—or “in”—the
plays is variously defined, and the constitutive plays themselves are
variously grouped, but one play that shows up on nearly everyone’s
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list is All’s Well That Ends Well.5 It is perhaps the least liked of these
roundly disliked works. Reasons for critical distaste are numerous,
including a lack of poetic justice for the rakish hero, the implausi-
bility of the young heroine’s love for such a man, and the mixture of
realistic and fantastic plot elements. The story is essentially taken
from Bocaccio’s Decameron, the ninth novel of the third day.6
Helena, the maiden in the play, is the daughter of a famed doc-
tor, Gerard de Narbonne, recently deceased. Having grown up at
court, she harbors a secret love for Bertram, the young Count of
Rossillion, whose own father has recently died, and whose mother
happens to be Helena’s guardian. His heart set on the glories of the
King’s Court, the handsome but immature Bertram sets off for Paris.
Afterwards, the Countess discovers Helena pining away, and stirs the
girl’s determination to win her son. She furnishes Helena’s way to
the Court of the King, a man himself on the brink of death. Once
there, Helena convinces the reluctant sovereign to try the cures she
has inherited from her famous father. If she fails, death will be her
payment; but if she succeeds, she may claim the hand of any of the
King’s wards. Needless to say, Helena succeeds. But the foolish
Bertram bridles at being coupled with a “base-born” physician’s
daughter. Ostensibly afraid of the King’s wrath, he marries, then
immediately abandons Helena before consummating their match.
Heartsick, Helena receives a note from Bertram in which he defies
acknowledgement of their marriage until she can win the ring from
his finger (a family legacy passed from father to son) and prove that
she carries his child.
At this point, the story becomes similar to another problem play
of general disliking, Measure for Measure. In both works, Shakespeare
uses a “bed-trick” to solve the complication. Helena, disguised as a
pilgrim of St. James, travels to Florence, where Bertram is fighting
in the wars. There, she discovers that he has been assailing Diana, a
young maiden who has managed to resist him. Helena convinces the
girl to ask for Bertram’s ring in exchange for a promise to meet the
logos
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young Count’s demands. At their secret, dark assignation, Helena
substitutes herself for Diana, and with a fecundity that is as reliable
as it is convenient, she conceives.
Bertram, victorious at war, then returns to the King’s court with
no thought for Diana. He is forgiven for his dastardly treatment of
Helena and is pledged in marriage to yet another girl (Helena hav-
ing spread the rumor that she is dead). But just before the ceremo-
ny, Diana arrives at court. She claims that Bertram has already
married himself to her, clandestinely. Bertram shows his old duplic-
itous colors, denying all. To make things worse, Helena, posing as
Diana in the dark, has given Bertram a ring to wear: one the King
had awarded her for curing him. The King spies the ring and suspects
Bertram has murdered Helena to get it. He then condemns the boy
to death. But before tragedy can win the day, comedy steps in: Diana
reveals Helena, who comes to court wearing Bertram’s ring and
bearing his child. Having satisfied the Count’s conditions, she wins
both his admiration and his pledge of love.
The story seems simple, and to some extent critics have found
it a half-gestated effort on Shakespeare’s part. After all, he was
writing some of his greatest tragedies around the time, and they
argue that having a Hamlet in your head can prove very distracting.
However, as is the case with all the problem plays, there is some-
thing in the simple story’s telling, in the complicated way that it is
resolved, that is worthy of close inspection. For this play involves
a very busy heroine (indeed, she is often criticized for the zeal of
her efforts) who devotes all of her talents and skills to obtaining the
man she loves. There is, in short, much ado in this play that
deserves focus, such as what exactly Helena is accomplishing, and
the means by which she accomplishes it. Because once Bertram is
won, Helena has rights and duties to her husband; Bertram ignores,
and even frustrates, those rights. But the determined Helena is
intent on realizing what she is entitled to, and in this play, the law
is on her side.
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In an attempt to account for past inabilities to explain the play,
G. K. Hunter says that critics have failed to apply a context by which
its virtues may be appreciated.7 Perhaps viewing the drama with an
eye toward the metaphorical issues involved in the idea of “con-
tract” marriages, and the way that Shakespeare plays with the dou-
ble meanings of legal terms, can provide one such context. Critics
have long spotted the significance of the legal instrument in the
problem comedies, but have labored mostly to identify the particu-
lar kind of contract that Shakespeare was alluding to; in other words,
they focus on what the contracts are, not on what they do.8 And
Shakespeare, of all artists, was one to use the stuff of his time to great
effect; the intricacies of the law are no exception.9 In fact, the idea
of marriage contracts is only the most apparent use of law in the
work, and the one toward which the other legal concepts point.
Throughout the work, the playwright employs complex
metaphors of entitlement, rights, and duties, and transactions that
establish a depth belied by a surface reading. As the play unfolds,
ideas revolving around inheritance—e.g., “descent,” “legacy,” “suc-
cession”—signal a devolvement of substantial qualities, such as
“honor.” Moreover, characters’ relationships are spoken of in terms
of “lawfulness,” one having the “right” and “duty” to “possess” the
other through sanctioned “deeds.” The trouble in All’s Well That Ends
Well is that each of these concepts falls short of being realized, just
as the clandestine marriage falls short of the valid institution. Braid-
ed through the superficially “light” dramatic apparatus is a serious
concern: frustration before fulfillment. A character such as Helena,
who works for fulfillment, must match herself against a character
such as Bertram, who works to frustrate that fulfillment. This is the
play’s dilemma, and it is through legal concepts that what is only
“partly true” becomes wholly so. The points the playwright makes
via topical circumstances, such as the ramifications of both private
marriage contracts and frustrated marriage contracts, are not limit-
ed to his own time; indeed, they point to a conception of marriage
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that is at once sacramental and practical. The vehicle of the play may
be the workings of marital contracts in the Renaissance, but the
tenor goes to the very root of what marriage is, or can be.
As always, to understand what Shakespeare is doing, the reader
must take note of beginnings and endings, scenes that provide a lens
for understanding his larger concerns. In All’s Well That Ends Well, the
drama begins with a bleak picture. Death has won both Bertram’s
father and Helena’s father. It is also in the process of claiming the
King, whose physicians have abandoned him to “the losing of hope by
time” (1.1.15). To make things worse, the Countess of Rossillion is
about to lose her son and heir, Bertram, to a position at court. She
expresses her loss in an image that epitomizes the play’s opening
tone: “In delivering my son from me, I bury a second husband”
(1.1.1–2). These losses evoke an atmosphere of frustration and lost
purpose at the outset; it is not fully overcome until the play’s close.
According to his mother, the Countess, Bertram is an “unsea-
soned” courtier, too young for his Parisian quest of honor (1.1.67).
Her own advice at their parting seems equally intended to address
Bertram’s present deficiencies and to mold his future conduct:
. . . succeed thy father
In manners as in shape. Thy blood and virtue
Contend for empire in thee, and thy goodness
Share with thy birthright!
(emphasis mine; 1.1.57–60)
Quite the opposite of his son, the old Count’s integrity—the union
of his “manners” and his “shape”—are a standard for true worth in
the play. The honor that flows from that worth does so rightfully.
The King describes the man:
So like a courtier, contempt nor bitterness
Were in his pride or sharpness; if they were
His equal had awak’d them, and his honour,
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Clock to itself, knew the true minute when
Exception bid him speak, and at this time
His tongue obeyed his hand. Who were below him
He us’d as creatures of another place,
And bow’d his eminent top to their low ranks,
Making them proud of his humility,
In their poor praise he humbled. Such a man 
Might be a copy to these younger times;
Which, followed well, would demonstrate them now
But goers-backward. (1.2.36–48)
The man’s decorum, a “clock to itself,” was manifest in his reserve
and humility, which the King offers as a copy to present-day youth.
In this way, the honorable old Count is similar to Helena’s father, a
physician whose “skill was almost as great as his honesty”
(1.1.17–18); Gerard de Narbonne’s reputation for virtue precedes
him with the King, and is so self-evident that Helena declines the
opportunity to praise him further: “Knowing him is enough”
(2.1.103). To this pair, whose honor has a productive influence, the
King himself is added: “whose worthiness would stir it [worth] up
where it wanted” (1.1.8–9).
In All’s Well That Ends Well, the much-heralded integrity of the old
Count and the old physician is spoken of in terms of descent, an unin-
terrupted legacy passing from father to child, uniting past, present,
and future. Along with the Countess’ hopes that Bertram will suc-
ceed his father in integrity, the King hopes the boy has inherited his
father’s “moral parts” (1.2.21). Like Bertram, Helena is charged to
“hold the credit” of her father (1.1.75), a duty that she fulfills by all
accounts. And later, when the action moves to Florence, Diana is told
“the honour of a maid is her name; and no legacy is so rich as hon-
esty” (3.5.11–13). Honor in terms of testamentary inheritance
extends throughout the work.
But despite the productive honor of the older generation, there
is a problem with the succession of virtue in France. The times are
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said to be retrograde, “going backwards” in degeneration (1.2.48).
The young lords lack the very thing that made the older men para-
digms of integrity, an honor born of virtue. Instead, their
apprehensive senses 
All but new things disdain; whose judgments are 
Mere fathers of their garments; whose constancies 
Expire before their fashions. (1.2.60–63)
Inconstancy is characteristic of the French youth. The “times” are
aligned with appearances rather than substance, as the young both
undervalue the worthy and overvalue the worthless. The reposito-
ries of true honor have died, and the legacies left to their successors
have been squandered. But this is so only in part, most notably in the
case of Bertram. In the case of Helena, the legacy of honor has made
a successful transmission. The two differ in the degree to which
they observe their duties to posterity; a comparison will highlight
the difference.
Both Helena and Bertram, having lost their fathers, are
“bequeathed” to others: Bertram to the King, who will be “a father”
(1.1.7) to his ward, and hold his son no dearer (1.2.76); and Hele-
na to the Countess, who becomes her second mother (1.1.35).10 But
while Bertram has succeeded only to his father’s “face” (1.2.19), his
“shape,” but not his “manners”—Helena has inherited all of her
father’s gifts:
her dispositions she inherits—which makes fair gifts fairer; for
where an unclean mind carries virtuous qualities, there com-
mendations go with pity; they are virtues and traitors too. In
her they are the better for their simpleness: she derives her
honesty and achieves her goodness. (1.1.37–42)
Helena is a combination of the legacy she has inherited and the
goodness she maintains.
shakespeare’s all’s well that ends well 
06-logos-harmon-pp115-142  8/8/01  3:43 PM  Page 123
Introducing a transactional metaphor that will figure into the
play’s themes of rights and duties, the Countess speaks of Helena’s
“lawful title” to love, which is envisioned as an estate. Her claim is
based simply on her essence (principal), without other “advantage”
(interest):
She herself, without other advantage, may lawfully 
make title to as much love as she finds; there is 
more owing her than is paid; and more shall be paid 
her than she’ll demand. (emphasis mine; 1.3.99–102)
Although she is owed much, Helena does not demand all that is
rightfully hers. Here the superfluous nature of advantage is analogous
to “additions” (in the sense of “titles”), which are castigated later in
the play. As the King points out, titles may arise from substance, just
as honors should flow from virtue. But if that is not the case, titles are
mere false accretions, yet another sign of the retrograde times
(2.3.130–35).
Many of the early scenes are spent establishing Helena’s true
worth. The Countess is not alone in appreciating the virtue the girl
has maintained; the King and the old Lord LaFew testify to her
worth as well. She amazes LaFew in her “sex, her years, profession
/ Wisdom and constancy . . .” (2.1.81–82). When Helena stakes her
life on her word—“wagering” herself for marriage—the King
accepts her wager precisely because she possesses so much:
Thy life is dear; for all that life can rate 
Worth name of life in thee hath estimate:
Youth, beauty, wisdom, courage—all 
That happiness and prime can happy call. (2.1.178–81)
The King’s testament invalidates Bertram’s later objection to his
marriage on the basis that Helena is unworthy. It also calls into ques-
tion his judgment. As Robert Hunter says, a wedding night with a
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beautiful, sexually attractive, honorable girl who has won the king’s
favor should prove—to a reasonable young man—“not the final
indignity, but the first consolation.”11 All see her value except for
Bertram and Parolles, a fact that reveals something about their own
worth.
In fact, Bertram comes to woo honor, not to wed it, behavior for-
bidden by the King (2.1.15). Disappointed that the sovereign has
kept him from battle due to his youth and inexperience, Bertram
laments he will have to remain at court: “Till honour be bought up
and no sword worn / But one to dance with. By heaven, I’ll steal
away!” (emphasis mine; 2.1.32–33). With this misunderstanding of
how honor is gained, he eventually barters away his heirloom, even
though it is “an honour ’longing to our house, / Bequeathed down
from many ancestors” (4.2.42–43), in order to fulfill his lust for
Diana:
Here, take my ring:
My house, mine honour, yea, my life be thine,
And I’ll be bid by thee. (4.2.51–53)
Bertram exhibits his immaturity by allying himself with a “go-
between” (5.3.253) and a “ring-carrier” (3.5.91). The foppish
Parolles, the personification of the empty words and fashion-mad
inconstancy deplored by the King, is Bertram’s choice for emulation.
But even Parolles testifies to Bertram’s inconstancy; when Bertram
decides to flee from marriage to the wars, Parolles wonders “Will
this capriccio [whim] hold in thee? art sure?” (2.3.289).
Still, Helena’s imagination “carries no favour in it but Bertram’s”
(1.1.81). She is aware of the difference in their estates, but after an
exchange with Parolles she acquires a determined outlook. Signifi-
cantly, their conversation involves banter using war and sex
metaphors. Helena asks how women may “barricado” against men
who assail their virginity (1.1.111). Parolles denies the wisdom of a
defense, based on virginity’s unnaturalness:
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It is not politic in the commonwealth of nature to preserve vir-
ginity. Loss of virginity is rational increase and there was never
virgin got till virginity was first lost. That you were made of
is mettle to make virgins. Virginity, by being once lost, may be
ten times found; by being ever kept it is ever lost. ’Tis too cold
a companion. Away with ’t! (1.1.123–30)
He continues his rail by suggesting virginity is against the rule of
nature—a “breeder of mites,” “full of self-love,” which “murders” and
“consumes” itself (1.1.133–40). He uses the language of productive
commerce to laud the products of natural love: “within the year it
[sex] will make itself two, which is a goodly increase; and the prin-
cipal itself not much the worse. Away with ‘t [virginity]!”
(1.1.144–46).
As the aim of lust is not generation, but satisfaction of the
appetite, its effects are just as opposed to fruitfulness as those of a
resolved virginity.12 By contrast, Parolles’ jokes articulate a pro-
ductivity that is normative for the play. Helena agrees in principle,
and the rest of their conversation is merely a debate over the prop-
er context for “goodly increase.” In response to how a virgin might
lose her virginity “to her own liking,” Parolles gives her the answer,
albeit unintentionally: “Let me see. Marry, ill, to like him that ne’er
it likes” (1.1.148).13 When he leaves, Helena rallies her hopes with
an appeal to nature—“The mightiest space in fortune nature brings
/ To join like likes, and kiss like native things” (1.1.218–19)—and
hopes to prove her worth by striving to show her merit (1.1.223).
Helena has found a way to lose her “honor” “honorably.”
Bargaining for marriage carries over into the Parisian court, where
LaFew, Helena, and the King bargain over the terms of the cure. Their
words contain double meanings, associating concepts in a way that
deepens the significance of both. LaFew, having come from Rossillion
with Helena, kneels before the King and asks for his pardon:
King: I’ll fee thee to stand up.
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LaFew [rising]: Then here’s a man stands that has brought his
pardon.
I would you had kneel’d, my lord, to ask me
mercy,
And that at my bidding you could so stand up.
(emphasis mine; 2.1.61–64)
Bringing a pardon in “fee,” i.e., an unencumbered right to absolute
possession, carries both the idea of paying for the pardon, as well as
the absolute nature of the pardon so purchased.14 There is a cost, but
the cost accomplishes all. LaFew’s desire to do the same for the
King—that is, in “fee”—also implies the largesse in his wishes for the
sovereign. And the cure he brings shows him to be as good in deed
as he is in intention. He states the life-giving qualities of the medi-
cine in terms of nature, with a subtext of sexual imagery folded in:
I have seen a medicine 
That’s able to breathe life into a stone,
Quicken a rock, and make you dance canary
With sprightly fire and motion; whose simple touch
Is powerful to araise King Pepin, nay,
To give great Charlemagne a pen in’s hand
And write to her a love-line. (2.1.71–77)
This is Helena’s cure, which can revitalize (“breathe life into a stone”)
the vigor of a declining King. But the despairing sovereign has noted
that his are times in which words are scattered without substance;
accordingly, he is wary of claims at miracle-working. To assure him,
Helena lists the consequences of breach, then demands something of
value from the King:
Helena: If I break time, or flinch in property
Of what I spoke, unpitied let me die,
And well deserv’d. Not helping, death’s my fee;
But if I help, what do you promise me?
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King: Make thy demand.
Helena: But will you make it even?
King: Ay, by my sceptre and my hopes of heaven.
Helena: Then shalt thou give me with thy kingly hand
What husband in thy power I will command.
Exempted be from me the arrogance 
To choose from forth the royal blood of France
My low and humble name to propagate
With any branch or image of thy state;
But such a one, thy vassal, whom I know 
Is free for me to ask, thee to bestow.
King: Here is my hand; the premises observ’d,
Thy will by my performance shall be serv’d;. . .
If thou proceed
As high as word, my deed shall match thy deed.
(emphasis mine; 2.1.186–201; 208–9)
The language works on two levels: first, on the level of transaction,
striking a deal by creating obligations and duties; second, on the level
of nature, implying essences, causes and effects. As such, they are
conceits that yoke the substance of what is promised with the per-
son who is making the promise, deepening the significance of each.
For example, Helena’s “property” is both her side of the bargain,
from which she will not “flinch,” and the qualities or attributes that
she claims for herself. The “fee” she demands is both her payment,
as well as the absolute, unencumbered right to what she will be
“entitled.” The “deed” that will match Helena’s is not only the act of
performance, but full ownership to what has been bargained for.
Also, layers of images—nature, land sale, and marriage—recur here.
From “observing the premises” (satisfying the contractual condi-
tions), the King will “perform” Helena’s desire to propagate her
name with a man of her choosing.
The agreement makes the King Helena’s “surety,” as both of them
claim in the rest of the play (4.4.3; 5.3.83–87), and borrows the ele-
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ments that  solidify the marriage contract: Helena and the King join
hands and make vows; Helena promises not to “break” time, similar
to “breaking faith”; the consideration between them is mutual—
“even”; and the agreement satisfactorily “performed.” Also, integri-
ty is demanded—her “words” must match her “deeds”; and integrity
is promised in return—the King’s “deed” will match Helena’s own
(2.1.209). Finally, Helena agrees to restore the King’s sound parts
before “twice the horses of the sun shall bring / Their fiery coach-
er his diurnal ring” (emphasis mine; 2.1.160–61). The suretyship
here enables Helena’s contract with Bertram.
Having satisfied her part of their agreement, and acquired the
King as her surety thereby, all that remains is for the King to perform
his own obligation. “Lustier” than a dolphin (2.3.26), he leads Hele-
na into court by the hand—in wedding fashion. He reaffirms his
duty, and her right, to the bachelors whose “father’s voice” he pos-
sesses (2.3.54).15 Under their bargain, Helena has the right to name
the deed that will match her deed to the King (2.1.209). In effect,
she is about to claim lawful title to love, as the Countess has said she
is due (1.3.99). Helena then overlooks the courtiers, referred to col-
lectively as this “youthful parcel,” which can mean both a small part
of something, as well as a portion of land (emphasis mine; 2.3.52).
With the aim to make a son out of her blood (2.3.97), she takes
Bertram by the hand (2.3.102–4).
But Bertram, whom the Lord LaFew has discovered to be “an ass”
(2.3.100), refuses the gift. Bertram wants to make his own choice,
by “the help of mine own eyes” (2.3.108).16 Choosing appearances
and discounting hope are the very errors Helena has counseled the
King against, to his great benefit. But Bertram knows Helena’s
breeding; he says disdain will corrupt him forever if he marries her.
In essence, Bertram questions the worth of his “consideration” under
the contract, i.e., what he is receiving of value under the bargain.
The King attempts to change the youth’s perspective, i.e., to
convince him that what he receives is truly honorable despite its
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appearance. The King himself has just learned to trust in the hope
offered by the physician’s daughter, despite the grim forecasts of his
doctors. He has good proof of what she has done for him:
’Tis only title thou disdain’st in her, the which 
I can build up.
. . .
If she be
All that is virtuous, save what thou dislik’st—
A poor physician’s daughter—thou dislik’st
Of virtue for the name. (2.3.117–18; 121–24)
His lesson, aimed at Bertram, is a particular application of the speech
he has made regarding the young lords in general, those who judge
by appearances and know nothing of honor but its garments. Honor’s
substance, says the King, is born of virtue, and needs no title—
“great additions”—to prove its authenticity; rather, it proves itself in
deeds. This is reminiscent of the Countess’ claim that Helena herself
is worthy of the lawful title of love, in principle alone, with no need
for further “advantage”(1.3.98). As is often the case when the char-
acters want to convey the meaning of reality, the King resorts to lan-
guage of title, with double entendre: “The property [both “quality”
and “estate”] by what it is should go, not by the “title” [both “name”
and “legal ownership”]. And again, images of nature and legacy are
related to honor:
She is young, wise, fair;
In these to nature she’s immediate heir,
And these breed honour; That is honour’s scorn,
Which challenges itself as honour’s born
And is not like the sire. (emphasis mine; 2.3.131–35)
The legitimacy images, applied earlier to what the King had feared
were Helena’s empty promises, recur here with respect to empty
logos
06-logos-harmon-pp115-142  8/8/01  3:43 PM  Page 130
honor. This further delineates the difference between Bertram’s
position and Helena’s. Helena, like the virtuous Cordelia in King
Lear, is worthy in and of herself. The King sums up the consideration
passing to Bertram under the contract: “Virtue and she is her own
dower” (2.3.143–44). The additions of “honour”— in the sense of
“titles,” as Bertram understands it—and “wealth” are superfluous in
the King’s eyes. They are the accretions added to the principal, not
the principal itself.
But Bertram cannot see it that way, and the difference between
the King’s understanding of true value and Bertram’s own explains
why the boy will not respect Helena’s right to him. The young
Count’s mistaken view of “titles” (honorifics) frustrates Helena’s
“title” (entitlement) to him. Rather than submit his will to the King’s
good judgment, he submits his “fancy” to the King’s “eyes”
(2.3.167–68), a misunderstanding of the faculties that are used in a
wise choice. And even this unwilling submission comes only after the
threat of disinheritance (2.3.162–66). Rather than suffer it, he pre-
tends to comply, taking Helena by the hand.
The King expresses his contentment at the contract’s formation:
Good fortune and the favour of the king 
Smile upon this contract; whose ceremony 
Shall seem expedient on the now-born brief,
And be perform’d tonight. The solemn feast 
Shall more attend upon the coming space,
Expecting absent friends. As thou lov’st her
Thy love’s to me religious; else, does err.
(emphasis mine; 2.3.177–83)
The King, as Helena’s surety, includes himself in the match—“as
thou lovest her / Thy love’s to me religious,” and adds a note of
sacrality to the contract, which LaFew picks up when he styles
Bertram’s change of position as a “recantation” (2.3.186). In light of
this, Bertram’s disobedience is all the more egregious.17
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Bertram reenters, newly married, and consults with his ally
Parolles. His plans have already taken shape: “Although before the
solemn priest I have sworn, I will not bed her” (2.3.265–66).
Parolles counsels disdain of marriage and home—“A young man
married is a man that’s marred” (2.3.294)—and a preference for
war: “To th’ wars, my boy, to th’ wars!” (2.3.274). Bertram
responds: “Wars is no strife / To the dark house and the detested
wife” (2.3.287–88). And instead of a marital union resulting in the
pain of separation, Bertram bemoans a separation from his fellow
soldiers: “I grow to you, and our parting is a tortured body” (2.1.36).
Later, the King will marvel that wives are such “monsters” to
Bertram that he must flee from them (5.3.154–56). This disdain for
marriage is matched by the young men who come to the war as a
“physic” (3.1.18–19). For them, the Florentine confrontation serves
as a perverse “nursery to our gentry, who are sick / For breathing and
exploit” (emphasis mine; 1.2.15–17). War, set against marriage,
breeds bloody exploits in its nursery.
Bertram plots to frustrate the contract by keeping it perpetual-
ly unrealized. Having pocketed the King’s wedding gift to furnish
himself, the Count reveals his plan:
I have writ my letters, casketed my treasure,
Given orders for our horses; and tonight,
When I should take possession of the bride,
End ere I do begin. (2.5.23–26)
Just as the King and Countess use the language of transaction and
title to convey essential meanings, Bertram uses it to illustrate his
nonperformance. A man lawfully entitled takes possession of his
estate, a right that Bertram will permanently forego. In some cir-
cumstances, failure to “enter” an estate made its transfer ineffectu-
al.18 This is Bertram’s plan, which he carries out in spite of
acknowledging the “time” for performance is “due” to Helena under
the “great prerogative and rite of love” (2.4.39–40). Here again, the
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“rite” carries the double meaning of ceremony and entitlement
(“right”), both accruing to Helena. But envisioning his wife as a
“clog,” a restraint that binds him to his contract, he denies her what
she is owed by refusing possession. He flaunts the perpetuity of their
unrealized marriage in a letter to his mother: “I have sent you a
daughter-in-law: she hath recovered the King, and undone me. I
have wedded her, not bedded her, and sworn to make the ‘not’ eter-
nal” (3.2.19–21); and in a letter to Helena herself:
When thou canst get the ring upon my finger, which never
shall come off, and show me a child begotten of thy body that
I am father to, then call me husband; but in such a “then” I
write a “never.” (3.2.56–59)
The challenges meant to frustrate performance act as “conditions
subsequent” to the contract, requiring certain acts be fulfilled before
the instrument can be termed fully executed.19 And the conditions
revolve around the proof of worth, since Bertram is disdainful of
Helena’s value. He denies her fulfillment until she can “prove” her-
self, a demand he repeats at the play’s end:
If you shall prove
This ring was ever hers, you shall as easy 
Prove that I husbanded her bed in Florence,
Where yet she never was.
(emphasis mine; 5.3.124–27).
Of course, Bertram’s conditions are added illegitimately. The con-
tract did not anticipate them and deserves execution on its face. But
as is often said in the play, Helena is owed more than she is paid, and
gives more than she demands; it is characteristic of her to meet con-
ditions she need not fulfill in order to prove her love.
Most bitter of all is his final defiance of Helena: “Till I have no
wife, I have nothing in France” (3.2.72). Bertram betrays his aversion
shakespeare’s all’s well that ends well 
06-logos-harmon-pp115-142  8/8/01  3:43 PM  Page 133
to reality by vowing to make the “not” eternal. In denying the con-
sequences of a marriage, he effectively denies life. But the specifici-
ty of his challenge will work to hoist him on his own petard. For his
terms have made Helena’s task clear: she will take his meaning—the
“not” eternal—and transform it into an eternal “knot,” i.e., take his
denial and turn it into affirmation. To satisfy the conditions, she
must take on a disguise, perform a trick by use of a double, and
become a “pilgrim”(3.5.30). That the pilgrimage to prove her worth
by deeds is to St. James (3.4.4), whose epistle includes the maxim
“faith without works is dead,” is especially appropriate under the cir-
cumstances.20 Helena will make “something” come of “nothing.”
Throughout the play, Bertram’s foolish alliance with Parolles tes-
tifies to his bad choices; what befalls Parolles is a bellwether of what
will befall Bertram. Two of Bertram’s wiser friends, the lords
Dumaine, decide to expose Parolles by tricking him into a betrayal
of their cause. They ambush and blindfold the fop, pretending to be
the enemy. To win his freedom, a terrified Parolles reveals his true
opinion of Bertram: “a dangerous and lascivious boy, who is a whale
to virginity, and devours up all the fry it finds” (4.3.212–13). And in
an accidental indictment of the young lord’s integrity, he uses lan-
guage revolving around the law, entitlement, and—most tellingly—
inheritance:
Sir, for a cardecue he [Dumaine] will sell the fee-simple
of his salvation, the inheritance of it; and cut th’
entail from all remainders, and a perpetual 
succession for it perpetually.
(emphasis mine; 4.3.269–72)
What is slanderous of Dumaine is applicable to Bertram, who has
just bartered away his family’s “honour”—the ring that has passed
from “son to son” for four to five generations (3.7.24). In effect his
actions have worked to “cut the entail” (limit the line of inheri-
tance)21 from all “remainders” (those who would succeed to the
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limited estate)22 forever (“perpetually”). Of course, this reference is
to more than the heirloom ring; by leaving his marriage unconsum-
mated, and showing a disdain for children, he also “cuts off ” the line
of succession itself. Significantly, upon arriving to witness Parolles’
trial, Bertram brags of the conquests he has just performed in the
same transactional language: “By an abstract”—a written outline of
a piece of property’s dimensions—he has effected unawares his
“main parcels of dispatch” (emphasis mine; 4.3.83–89), which
include the bedding of his wife.
At her assigned meeting, Diana tells the insistent Bertram that
her own mother did but her duty towards her father, a duty that
Bertram owes his wife (4.2.12–13). She says Bertram would simply
have her “serve him,” taking her roses and leaving her with the thorns
of barrenness, an image of a fruitless union (4.2.17–19). Finally, she
informs Bertram, who cannot distinguish the authentic from the
dissembling, that a multitude of oaths does not make them true; a
plain single oath, vowed true, is worth more (4.2.23–25). This dis-
junction makes his many vows worthless—like contracts without the
validating “seal”:
Therefore your oaths
Are words and poor conditions but unseal’d.
(emphasis mine; 4.2.29–30).
The purpose of the bed-trick is to help Helena gain access to
Bertram’s bed, secure his ring, and conceive his son, a purpose that
will—under Bertram’s own conditions—validate their marriage
contract. The child conceived by the trick will in effect “seal” a con-
tract that has lain inchoate.
Diana’s image of the contractual seal, which leaves an impression
or imprint, is similar to the images of man’s own creation by God,
and of the father’s imprint on his child.23 After explaining her “hon-
our” (chastity) to be a “ring” of equivalent value to Bertram’s “hon-
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our” (legacy, 4.2.45–51)—a comparison lost on the young lord—
she secures his ring in exchange for her own (4.2.55–66). Bertram’s
offenses are doubled here, as they extend to both self and posterity.
But upon conquering the “maiden bed,” he will receive another ring,
one that—unbeknownst to Bertram—signifies the King’s surety of
Helena. Speaking as Helena’s proxy, Diana tells him he has “won /
A wife of me, though there my hope be done” (4.2.64–65).
Helena’s hopes are indeed “done” in the satisfaction of the con-
tract, for it is she who meets Bertram and consummates the mar-
riage.24 In this achievement, she also satisfies Bertram’s conditions to
prove her worth—conceiving his child and winning his ring, the
legacy of honor he had meant to squander in fulfillment of his lust.
The act intended to flesh his will, through Helena’s agency, actually
enfleshes his posterity. For in a bounty of graces to come, Bertram
will receive not only the honorable Helena, but will also retrieve the
emblem of his legacy in the form of the ring, and the assurance of
that legacy’s succession in the form of his child.
But before the achievement of this resolution, Helena must prove
the contract. And when Bertram comes to court, that contract is in
grave jeopardy. Helena is thought dead, and Bertram is about to
enter into another marriage with LaFew’s daughter, Maudlin
(5.3.68). In short, Bertram’s characteristic duplicity is about to
infringe upon rights that are exclusively Helena’s.25 She will have to
prevent that infringement by her proof, which converges upon the
rings. For at this point the significance of the bands has changed;
according to Bertram’s own terms, the bands are now fused with the
marriage through consummation.
For most of the scene, Bertram flounders in the chaos he has
wrought. Ownership is confused: what was Helena’s seems to have
been taken from her: “Had you that craft to reave her / Of what
should stead her most” (5.3.86–87); what was Diana’s seems to have
been denied: “He stole from Florence, taking no leave, and I follow
him to his country for justice” (5.3.142–44). Bertram seems to have
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bartered away all legacies, his own and those of others, in service to
his will. His mendacity only draws him in deeper. Parolles testifies
Bertram loved in the way that all gentlemen love: “he lov’d her, sir,
and lov’d her not” (5.3.245). Bertram has no “deeds” to gain the
friendship of the King’s thoughts (5.3.182–83). Death threatens:
Unless thou tell’st me where thou hadst this ring
Thou diest within this hour. (5.3.277–78)
Of course, Bertram cannot tell because he does not know. His deliv-
erer possesses that knowledge, the “surety” (5.3.291) for the ring
who will redeem both Bertram and Diana. Bertram’s hope is resur-
rected when Diana sends for the “jeweler that owes the ring”: “Dead
though she be she feels her young one kick” (5.3.290, 296). Helena
appears, bearing all that had seemed lost, and redeeming all that had
seemed wasted. Ring, writing, witnesses, and child, all testify to the
validity of a claim she has won, not once, but twice:
O my good lord, when I was like this maid,
I found you wondrous kind. There is your ring,
And, look you, here’s your letter. This it says:
When from my finger you can get this ring 
And are by me with child, et cetera. This is done;
Will you be mine now you are doubly won?
(emphasis mine; 5.3.303–8)
After the contract is proved, the play ends with anticipating the
delivery of a child to Bertram, which signals unity and prospects for
the future. This is an orientation wholly different from that at the
play’s beginning, where the metaphoric “delivery” of a child—
Bertram himself—signals separation and death.
Several times the play’s action seems to be done. For example, the
King announces “All is whole” just as the contract and its parties are
farthest from resolution (5.3.37). Even though Helena has put forth
her proofs, Bertram must confirm their union. The disruption has
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caused a rift, a quasi-state that challenges reality. Diana, speaking in
Helena’s behalf, explains the gravity of Bertram’s unfaithfulness:
If you shall marry
You give away this hand and that is mine,
You give away heaven’s vows and those are mine,
You give away myself which is known mine;
For I by vow am so embodied yours
That she which marries you must marry me—
Either both or none. (5.3.168–74)
Until the “titled” Bertram claims her, the proven Helena says she is “but
the shadow of a wife you see, / The name and not the thing”
(5.3.301–2). Bertram then promises to love her, awaiting the proof of
her deeds (5.3.310). In effect, Helena awaits Bertram’s acceptance of
her suit, just as the Epilogue—in a metadramatic turn that itself rests
upon the theme of debts, obligations, and marriage—says the players’
“ends” await the acceptance of the audience, by the lending of their
“hands,” and the taking of “our hearts” (emphasis mine; Epilogue 1–6).
At play’s end, the disjunction that existed in the marital contract
has been remedied by legal means, ones that have themselves been
frustrated, or only partly realized, for most of the play. Unfulfilled
“legacies,” incomplete “deeds,” dispossessed “titles,” are all brought to
fruition by Helena, who both wins the object of her affection,
Bertram, and overcomes his objections to their union. Bertram has
wanted the privileges of marriage without the estate, the “great pre-
rogative and rite of love” without acknowledging the “lawful right”
Helena has to him, and he to her. Shakespeare plays on that prob-
lem in this work, where “rites” establish “rights,” and “deeds”—
even those accomplished in the dark of night, under strange
circumstances—establish “lawful deeds.” In the process, the poten-
tial—Helena and Bertram’s marriage, and Bertram’s own honor—
becomes the actual. And actuality in marriage is the very thing that
the Christian Church was striving for in sixteenth-century Europe.
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The contracts in All’s Well That Ends Well reveal Shakespeare’s
skill at breathing life into the very devices by which he furthers and
resolves his plots. In this play, the deficient contract is not just a sta-
tic fact, a problem that supplies some necessary dramatic friction;
instead, it becomes the instrument by which disjunction becomes
union. This implies not only a role for the law in plot resolution, but
also hints at some larger, thematic roles that the law can have in his
works. In this play, a party’s status changes vis-à-vis another by virtue
of his doing some deed, of his saying some words. A careful, lawful
balance of those things can effect a significant transformation, one
with incumbent rights and duties born from entitlement. The dis-
covery of that balance provides unity between both the characters in
the play, and between the players and their audience.
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